Epidemiologists are aware that the estimated effect of an exposure can be biased if the investigator fails to adjust for confounding factors when analyzing either a prospective or retrospective etiologic study. Standard texts warn, however, that intervening factors are an exception: one should not adjust for any factor which is intermediate on the causal pathway between the exposure and the disease. Other factors which are not on the causal pathway but are caused in part by the exposure are often adjusted for in epidemiologic studies. This paper illustrates that bias can result when adjustment is made for any factor which is caused in part by the exposure under study and is also correlated with the outcome under study. Intervening variables are only one example of this phenomenon. The misleading effects of this practice are illustrated with examples.
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tions if the investigator fails to adjust for it carefully in the analysis or match on it in the design of the study.
In a purely descriptive study, whose intent is to estimate absolute or relative risk, as related to all potentially prognostic factors, confounding per se is not an important problem: one simply includes all measured risk factors in the predictive model. By contrast, we shall consider a study whose objective is to assess a possible etiologic association.
It is well recognized (e.g., l-3) that, in the context of an etiologic study, any factor which is intermediate on the causal pathway between the exposure and the disease (figure I a) should not be treated as a confounder and should not be accounted for in the 2 Weinberg analysis or matched on in the design. The purpose of this paper is to discuss a more general situation, in which a factor that changes the estimated effect of the exposure, and thus appears to be a confounder or an effect modifier, should in many instances be omitted from the analysis: namely, whenever the factor may itself have been affected by the exposure. Inclusion of such a factor, either as a matching factor, an explicit term in a model, or as a basis for stratification, can severely bias measures of exposureassociated risk, as will be illustrated.
Epidemiologists generally recognize that factors which are related to the disease outcome only because they are causally related to the exposure (e.g., membership in Alcoholics Anonymous among alcohol con- sumers) should not be considered confounders and should not be adjusted for (I). This paper goes beyond this rule to assert that bias can result even when a factor which is caused in part by the exposure is related to the disease among the unexposed. This means that, under certain circumstances, independent risk factors which appear to be confounders should not be adjusted for.
EXAMPLE: SPONTANEOUS ABORTION HISTORY
Suppose a cohort of women is recruited early in pregnancy and followed for the occurrence of spontaneous abortion, where some but not all of these women report an exposure thought possibly to cause pregnancy loss. History of spontaneous abortion is known to be related to risk, even among the unexposed, and, under the study hypothesis, could also be related to the exposure, if the exposure tends to have been long term. Thus, it could be regarded as a potential confounder. At the same time, history of spontaneous abortion is almost certainly not on the causal pathway between exposure and loss of the current pregnancy. Such a history is more plausibly viewed as a marker for elevated risk ( 4 ) , and this elevated risk may be due in part to effects of the same exposure on past pregnancies. History of spontaneous abortion does satisfy classical criteria for "confounding" given in standard epidemiology texts (e.g., see Rothman (3)): it presumably serves as a marker for causally related factors, and it may also be associated (under the study hypothesis) with the exposure under study. Should it then be adjusted for in the estimation of the exposureassociated risk?
For notational simplicity, let us suppose we have information for one additional prior pregnancy for each woman, and that the exposure of interest was either present during both pregnancies or absent during both. Suppose the exposure, E, acts by increasing the risk of a certain underlying abnormality, A, and that this abnormality was either present during both pregnancies or absent during both. (The abnormality might be, for ex- A similar calculation for the unexposed yields a conditional risk of 0.591, for a stratum-specific relative risk of 1.32. The calculations for the stratum with a prior live birth also lead to a stratum-specific relative risk of 1.32. Thus, there is homogeneity across the strata defined by history of spontaneous abortion, and apparent confounding, in a mathematical sense, since the pooled relative risk following stratification is markedly lower than the crude relative risk, which was 1.85.
The analysis that "adjusts" for history of spontaneous abortion has thus markedly reduced the estimated exposure-related relative risk. And yet, under our assumptions, if the exposed women had never been exposed, their risk would not differ from that of the unexposed women, so that, by recently proposed definitions (5), there is no confounding to be adjusted for. It seems clear, then, that the inclusion of this factor as a stratification variable has adjusted away part of the effect under study and understated the importance of the exposure in increasing the risk of spontaneous abortion.
Breslow and Day (I) warned of a similar bias toward the null in a related context where there has been "overmatching." In their examples, stratification was carried out on a medical condition which revealed signs of early stages of the disease under study, such as chronic cough when lung cancer is the endpoint, or uterine bleeding when endometrial cancer is the endpoint of.interest.
A modification of the spontaneous abortion example shows that, in our more general context, the bias need not be toward the null, and the stratum-specific relative risks need not be equal. Consider instead what happens if the risk of the abnormality is 0.75 among those with the exposure, and 0.3 among those without. If the risk of spontaneous abortion is 0. 7 in those with the abnormality and 0.05 in those without, then the true exposure-associated relative risk can be shown to equal 2.19. Among women whose prior pregnancy ended in spontaneous abortion, the relative risk is 1.13, while, among women without such a history, the relative risk is 2.87. The investigator could report these estimates separately, interpreting the discrepancy as strong evidence for effect modification. For example, it might be argued that those without a history of spontaneous abortion are less likely to have a genetically based problem and more likely to have an environmental cause, and so on. Again, the inclusion of the correlated factor has effectively muddled the assessment of exposure-associated risk.
We1nberg
A skeptic might argue that the case here is not so clear and that a good reason for including a factor such as history of spontaneous abortion is that it can serve to some extent as a surrogate for unmeasured risk factors that may themselves be confounders. While it is true that those potential confounders being implicitly adjusted for inappropriately include the exposure under study, couldn't they also include some genuine confounders?
One sees readily, however, that such an adjustment does a remarkably poor job of "controlling" for unmeasured confounders. Consid~r a scenario identical to the one just considered, except that the exposure is unrelated to risk, while some bad actor, C, invariably accompanies it. Then, the above algebraic development yields a relative risk of 1.13 among those with a prior loss and 2.87 among those without, results quite inconsistent with the truth ( 1.0). Thus, considered naively as an adjustment for unmeasured confounding variables, that strategy is appallingly ineffective.
GENERAL PROBLEM
More generally, suppose disease D is under study and data are available on the presence or absence of some factor, F. Suppose the exposure, E, increases the risk ofF and of D. Suppose also that F and D are correlated among those with the exposure. Such a correlation could arise, for example, when F and D are separate manifestations of the same underlying abnormality ( figure I b) , as in the preceding example. Examples are easy to find. In a recent study to assess the role of blood pressure in cognitive impairment in the elderly, use of cardiovascular medications, self-reported history of stroke, and self-assessment of health were all listed as potential confounders (6) . The use of medications is influenced by the "exposure" under study (blood pressure), history of stroke may be intermediate on the causal pathway, and self-assessment of poor health may be influenced both by the exposure and, what may be worse, by the endpoint under study. Results corresponding to those illustrated above will again hold if such factors are treated as confounders, leading to misleading conclusions regarding the role of blood pressure in cognitive impairment.
What happens in the situation where the exposure increases the risk of both F and D, but the two are independent within the exposed and within the unexposed? One can show by straightforward algebra that if D and F occur independently within the exposed and also within the unexposed, then the stratum-specific relative risks correspond to the crude, pooled-data relative risk. (This also follows from the classical understanding of confounding: a factor must be associated with the disease among the unexposed to be a confounder.) Thus the problem arises only when F is associated with D within at least one of the strata defined by the exposure.
EXAMPLES OF CORRELATION-INDUCING SCENARIOS
It is instructive to consider three specific scenarios where this kind of exposure-related factor would arise. First, F and D may represent separate manifestations of a single underlying abnormality (figure I b), which is caused by E, as in the spontaneous abortion example. Second, there could be correlated susceptibility to F and D among members of the population, due to unmeasured shared risk factors (figure lc), e.g., genetic. Or, third, a correlation between F and D may arise secondary to variations in true exposure within exposure strata, provided risks of F and D are both dose-related to the exposure. In a realistic situation, any mix of these three mechanisms is possible.
First tion example also illustrated that stratification on F can induce heterogeneity among risk ratios. Second, suppose the risk ofF, Pr,(F), and the risk of D, Pr,(D), covary among individuals, indexed by i, in the population (e.g., due to common causal components which have not been measured), but the outcomes are independent within each individual. As an example of this, rehabilitated intravenous drug users may be prone to other risky behaviors as well and may be at increased risk for accidental death in later life. As another example, women with human ·papilloma-virus may also be susceptible to other venereal pathogens, due to inherent variations in resistance among women with similar exposures.
We suppose that, for each individual, the joint occurrence probability is given as the product, Pr,(D)Pr,(F) (i.e., the outcomes are independent within individuals), but of course the individual risks, Pr,(D) and Pr,(F), are unobservable. For simplicity of illustration, assume a study where a cohort is followed for a fixed length of time, and one ascertains whether or not each member has developed F and D by the end of followup.
The bias induced here by stratification on F can be dramatic. If one assumes that the exposure-associated relative risk forD is RD for each individual, then the estimated relative risk is RD for the F stratum, but is not RD for the stratum without F (see Appendix 2) . For that stratum, the relative risk can be biased either toward or away from the null, and this bias can be extreme. Thus, under this scenario, considerable bias, taking the form of apparent effect modification, can arise from stratifying on the correlated factor, F.
Third, suppose the measured exposure E has to some extent been misclassified, or a number of different exposure levels have been grouped, and F and D both have a positive dose-response relation to the true exposure, but occur independently at each level of true exposure. One can show (Appendix 3) that the apparent relative risk within the stratum including those with F is Toward a Clearer Def1nrt1on of Confounding 5 elevated compared to the truth. The best way to intuit this is that among those with F the true exposure of the exposed is relatively high. Correlated, exposure-related factors may be common. Even if D and Fare physiologically distinct endpoints, if there is a dose-related effect of the exposure on both, then correlation between them will be induced even with the best dosimetry, if there are person-to-person differences in absorption of E or in the efficacy of relevant metabolic detoxification pathways.
DISCUSSION
While it is recognized that, when the exposed (such as those undergoing estrogen therapy) come under increased medical surveillance, one cannot hope to correct the resulting disease detection bias by stratifying on the diagnostic procedures to which study participants have been subjected (7), the general problem of apparent confounding or effect modification due to consequences of exposure seems to have been passed over in the standard epidemiology texts ( 1-3, 8 ).
The present development has shown that bias can result from adjusting for or matching on such a factor, even when the factor is not intermediate on the causal pathway.
While the development here has been limited to a dichotomous other factor and a dichotomous exposure, the problem occurs in broader settings as well. The "factor" could be the results of a laboratory test, such as serum cholesterol level, and the exposure could be on a continuous scale; the same concerns would apply. One way to look at this problem is that the correlated factor, F, serves as a partial surrogate for the disease, so that the endpoint is to some extent represented on both sides of the model equation.
Examples of factors causally related to the exposure under study are plentiful in the epidemiologic literature. Some fall straightforwardly into the paradigm we have considered (6, 9, 10) . Other examples are more subtle. One study matched drivers involved in two-car collisions, defining the at-fault driver as the case, to assess the role of alcohol in fatal auto accidents (II). In this study, 6 Weinberg the factor matched on was involvement in a fatal accident, and this could also be causally related to the exposure (alcohol), regardless of which driver was judged to be at fault. (People driving under the influence are less able to avoid accidents and also less able to respond appropriately once an accident has occurred.)
The basis for the association between a potential confounding factor and the disease under study may often be unclear, and informed decisions must be made. If history of infertility is considered when ovarian cancer is the outcome of interest, such a history could plausibly play a double role, both serving as a marker for inherent risk, and simultaneously as a manifestation of an underlying abnormality that may have been caused in part by the exposure under study, if that exposure tended to have been long term. In my view, the model that does not include adjustment for the correlated endpoint is the more credible one when the basis for the exposure-"confounder" relation is ambiguous.
Epidemiologists are acutely conscious of the danger of over-interpreting associations as causal, and it may be as a consequence of this that they sometimes avoid thinking about the potentially causal nature of associations between exposures of interest and potential confounders. It is all too easy to fall into a purely empirical approach to analysis, where covariates are added to the model one by one and retained if they seem to make a difference. Valid inference would be better served if, perhaps with the aid of causal diagrams, careful consideration were given to whether each factor should be in the model, particularly if the factor may have been caused in part by the exposure under study. The standard definitions of confounding should be revised to specify that factors which may have been caused in part by the exposure under study should not routinely be treated as potential confounders.
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APPENDICES APPENDIX 1
The case where D and Fare both manifestations of the same underlying abnormality, A. where E denotes the risk of A in the unexposed and R is the exposure-associated relative risk for A. This relative risk (and the analogous one for those without F) can be very close to 1.0 when E is small. (As we pass to the limit, letting E approach 0, the ratio tends to 1.) Thus, extreme bias toward the null can result from stratification on the correlated factor, F.
APPENDIX 2
The case where susceptibilities to D and F are correlated among individuals in the population. We suppose that for each individual the joint occurrence probability is given as the product Pr,(D)Pr,(F) (i.e., the outcomes are independent within individuals), but of course the individual risks Pr,(D) and Pr,(F) are unobservable. For simplicity of illustration, assume a study where a cohort is followed for a fixed length of time, and one ascertains whether or not each member has developed F and D by the end of follow-up. Under this design, the joint occurrence probability for a randomly selected member of the population is Pr(F, D) = Ex[Pr 1 (F)Pr,(D)], where the notation Ex[ ] denotes averaging across members of the population. Suppose the exposure occurs independently of inherent risk, and affects the risk of D for each individual by a factor RD, and the risk ofF by a factor RF. Then the joint probability for the two outcomes in a randomly selected exposed individual is given by:
